Before being able to answer key practical questions dependent on a criterion of personal identity (e.g., am I justified in anticipating surviving the death of my body?), we must first determine which general approach to the issue of personal identity is more plausible, reductionism or non-reductionism. While reductionism has become the more dominant approach amongst philosophical theorists over the past thirty years, non-reductionism remains an approach that, for all these theorists have shown, could very well still be true. My aim in this paper is to show that non-reductionism is actually either irrelevant -with respect to the practical questions we want answered -or logically impossible. In arguing for this conclusion, I draw from a case Derek Parfit has employed -the Combined Spectrum -and I provide a number of variations to it which ultimately reveal that we have no possible rational recourse other than to become reductionists.
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Some of these criteria may be more or less equivalent, of course. Psychological continuity with its normal cause, say, once "normal" is specified, may just coincide with one of the last three versions of the Physical Criterion, and the same could go for psychological continuity with a reliable cause. 6 But the initial point is that reductionism alone does not get us very far with respect to the generation of a specific criterion of identity. In addition, an advocate of reductionism simpliciter will have no ready answers for the questions that motivated our project. Consider the issue of immortality, for instance. On Physical Criterion (a), I could not survive the death of my body, insofar as it seems impossible for there to be a body in an afterlife that is continuous with my decaying body on earth (and the issue is made even more clear if my body is cremated after I die). But on Psychological Criterion (c), I could conceivably survive the death of my body, just in case God, say, constructs a person in Heaven with whom I am psychologically continuous (and God wouldn't even have to be able to do so reliably, on this version; even if a bungling God were occasionally to get it right, that would be enough to establish the possibility). Much more work, then, would be needed to specify which of the several variations of reductionism is correct before we could get any real answers to our motivating questions.
Providing this specification, however, is not my concern here, for before we engage in any such work we need first to find out why reductionism in general is a more compelling metaphysical view than non-reductionism. If non-reductionism could still be true, then a negative answer yielded by the proper reductionist specification of identity regarding the prospects of surviving the death of my body would remain haunted by the specter that such survival is nevertheless possible. For all the reductionist may say that casts doubt on our prospects for immortality, for instance, the non-reductionist may always reply that it is nevertheless possible that there is some further fact true of us that could provide the necessary mechanism for getting us beyond this mortal coil. My aim here is to cut off this reply once and for all by showing that the non-reductionist stance is either utterly irrelevant or utterly incoherent. I begin with a few well-known arguments against non-reductionism, which as they stand do not do the trick. I will then offer several variations on a Parfitian thought experiment that collectively do.
Ego-ism
The reason we should be reductionists, Parfit maintains, is that non-reductionism is extremely hard to believe. The non-reductionist, of course, holds that our identity in its nature involves a deep, further fact and does not involve simply the holding of certain more particular facts. So the non-reductionist believes that even when we have gathered all the facts together regarding the body, brain, and experiences of the person in question, we still do not have the key further fact necessary to determine questions of identity. For the non-reductionist, persons involve something more than the sum of their material parts and thus cannot simply be reduced to them. As a further result, questions of identity are, for the non-reductionist, always determinate: identity is not a matter of degree but is, rather, all-or-nothing. The paradigm example of the deep further fact of personhood for the non-reductionist is the Cartesian Ego, a separately existing entity. 7 Parfit's line against this view is not, as some have maintained, that it is unintelligible, but rather that it might have been true. Those who hold that we are separately existing entities claim that the carrier of psychological continuity is the soul, or something like the Cartesian Ego.
Parfit feels that evidence could have been given to support such a theory. 8 For example, suppose a Japanese women claims to remember having lived a life as a Celtic warrior in the Bronze Age.
Based on her apparent memories, many of her predictions could be checked out by archaeologists. She may remember burying a particular style of headdress or bracelet in a certain place, say, and archaeologists might find such an item in an area shown to have been undisturbed for 2,000 years. And this woman may make many other predictions that are also verified.
Then suppose that many other people have similar experiences, and their predictions are also similarly verified. If we had no other way of explaining such phenomena, then, it seems, we would be forced to accept some sort of psychological continuity between, for example, the Celtic warrior and the Japanese woman. And, further, if we were able to verify that there was no physical continuity between the two, then we would have to abandon the theory that the brain is the carrier of memory. We may then have to conclude that the carrier of psychological continuity is something non-physical, something immaterial, something very much like the soul, or, more particularly, the Cartesian Ego. This would mean that we are actually separately existing entities: personal identity would not just consist in facts about brains and bodies, but would also have to involve the further fact that we are essentially purely mental entities that can exist independently of bodies and brains. And it would also mean that questions of our identity would always have determinate answers, for these entities would have an all-or-nothing existence.
But of course we have no evidence of such cases. And in fact we have a great deal of evidence that indicates that the carrier of psychological continuity is the brain. So while the nonreductionist theory --the theory that we, as separately existing entities, are essentially Cartesian Egos --may have been true, given certain evidence, we do not have any of the required evidence, and the evidence we do have seems strongly to indicate that the theory is not true. Thus, reductionism is by far the more compelling view.
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How convincing is this argument, though? Appealing to evidentiary considerations is a rather tricky matter when it comes to dealing with immaterial substances, and the methodology Parfit employs here might very well beg the question. After all, if the Ego we're investigating is truly immaterial -a purely thinking thing -then it is by definition impossible to verify via empirical means. Unextended substances are beyond our empirical ken. For instance, a believer in the Cartesian view might reply to the Japanese Woman argument that souls simply aren't reincarnated -they get assigned one body on earth and are, after that body's death, "transported"
to the afterlife. But while on earth they are the true carriers of psychology and are thus the preservers of identity. Looking for psychological continuity between some existing person now and a person dead 2000 years is, therefore, going to be an utter waste of time.
Indeed, rejoinders are available to the Cartesian theorist for any number of so-called evidentiary considerations against the view. Consider, for instance, the claim that the mental is surely dependent on the physical, given the overwhelming evidence we have that psychological changes accompany physical changes to the brain, e.g., drug hallucinations, Phineas Gage-type cases (in which the destruction of a part of the brain produces great personality changes), Nevertheless, there remains some pull to the argument. For it does seem that if it's truly the case that an account of identity is divorced from our practical epistemological concerns about reidentification, then it is just irrelevant. And the Soul Criterion is just that. We reidentify people via their physical and/or psychological features -we lack the ability to do anything else.
So even if the Soul Criterion were true, it would be utterly useless for the practical matters of assessing moral responsibility, determining goods distributions, or accounting for future-oriented prudential anticipation. Consequently, for our present purposes, this version of non-reductionism is a dead end, and from here on out, I will simply assume that the only practically relevant general view of identity is one that focuses on material relations between bodies, brains, and/or brain-based (mental) events.
Nevertheless, one might maintain a more subtle non-reductionist view, one that holds that yes, we are essentially material creatures, but the facts about our identity do not just consist in facts about brains, bodies, etc. Indeed, they consist in some further fact about our separate existence from mere brains, bodies, etc. Perhaps we -persons -are something emergent from our material constituents. Or perhaps we occupy a certain privileged perspective as ongoing subjects of experience, entities that have brains, bodies, experiences, etc. Citing only the relations between the materials from which we emerge, or the materials that we own or have, therefore, would overlook certain crucial facts about the conditions under which we -separately existing persons -actually persist.
This form of non-reductionism maintains that the "I" involves something more than, or at the very least something different from, the sum of its material parts, even though the "I" itself is not immaterial. It exists separately from brains, bodies, etc., even though it does not exist independently of them (as the soul would, allegedly). It involves a further fact. Now on this version of non-reductionism, the further fact either obtains or it does not. That is, questions of identity always have determinate answers: either "I" exist or "I" do not. The reason for this entailment is that, according to these views, our identity involves one more thing than mere particular (numerous, perhaps) facts about brains, bodies, etc., viz., it involves a fact about the entity which is me, some one thing that is distinct from the mere agglomeration of my material constitution. So given that this further fact is a fact, it either obtains or it doesn't. If we are separately existing entities, then questions of identity will always have determinate answers.
The ideal way, then, to refute such a position would be to argue that personal identity is not always determinate. If this more subtle non-reductionist (materialist) view is the only remaining non-reductionist view, and if we could show that questions of identity can be indeterminate, then we could safely set aside non-reductionism from this point forward as either irrelevant (in the "soul" version) or straightforwardly false (in the "materialist" version). So let's
give it a shot.
Before I Was Garbo: Indeterminacy and the Combined Spectrum
Consider the case Parfit calls the "Combined Spectrum." 12 This case is intended to capture the entire range of possible psychological and physical continuities that may obtain between two person-stages. 13 The question to consider, then, is who is the survivor at each stage of the spectrum? There are only three possible replies: (a) the survivor would always be me (even in the case where the scientist flips all 100 switches);
(b) there is a sharp borderline at some point on the spectrum, before which the survivor would be me and after which the survivor would not be me; and (c) the identity of the survivor would occasionally be indeterminate. This last is, of course, the reductionist response.
One could maintain (a) only if one held that personal identity is entirely independent of any psychological and/or physical characteristics or relations, a position Parfit calls the "Featureless Cartesian View," 14 and this option is rather easily dismissed as unintelligible. If what makes me me is utterly divorced from any of my psychological or physical features, then it is just as likely that I have a river of qualitatively identical egos/souls running through me than that I somehow survive from day to day in my present body. For practical reasons cited earlier with respect to the Soul Criterion, then, given the utter independence between this view and our desired ability to be able to reidentify people, it is not one able to answer any of our questions with respect to identity. And there are several other absurdities implied by the view which render it unworthy of attention here. 15 But what of (b)? This option allows for what certainly seems obvious: the person at the near end of the spectrum is me, and the person at the far end of the spectrum is not me, i.e., it is GarboR. But the respondent here must claim that there is a borderline at some point on the spectrum, before which the survivor is me and after which the survivor is GarboR (or, perhaps, is yet a third, different person, a position I will discuss in detail below). But where could such a borderline be? Is it at the 50% mark? At the 51% mark? At the 49% mark? Somewhere else?
Even if there could never be any evidence for where this borderline is, anyone holding that the identity of the survivor must always be determinate (whether it's me or not me) must hold that the borderline is there, somewhere.
Parfit's reaction to this option is that it is "hard to believe," 16 for two reasons. First, it is hard to believe that the difference between my life and my death could actually consist in such small differences in my physical and psychological features (one percent, in the case as I have described it). Most of us, after all, believe that the difference between a future person's being me and that person's being someone else is "a deep difference." 17 Second, he claims it is hard to believe that there must be a sharp borderline for which we could never have any evidence, i.e., if we could have no evidence for such a thing, why would we ever claim it to be there in the first place? 18 Nevertheless, such a response may still be easier to believe than Parfit's own solution that our identity may occasionally be indeterminate. As Bernard Williams writes, "To be told that a future situation is a borderline one for its being myself that is hurt, that it is conceptually undecidable whether it will be me or not, is something which, it seems, I can do nothing with; because, in particular, it seems to have no comprehensible representation in my expectations and the emotions that go with them." 19 And later: "There seems to be an obstinate bafflement to mirroring in my expectations a situation in which it is conceptually undecidable whether I occur." 20 While Williams is more concerned with the normative issues surrounding my anticipation/concern about my possible future survival (as opposed to an exclusive focus on whether or not I will survive in the sorts of cases under discussion), because the rational appropriateness of one or the other such attitude is directly parasitic on facts about who the survivor will be, the "bafflement" he admits to having about appropriate expectations seems straightforwardly transferable to bafflement about identity's being indeterminate. Consequently, if option (c) is just as hard to believe -just as baffling -as (b), Parfit's comments will be insufficient to move us to become reductionists on the matter (on the assumption that we adhere to the "default" view that our identity is always determinate).
Nevertheless, there is a much more decisive way to eliminate the view of the Sharp Borderline Theorist (from here on out, "the SBT") in (b), namely, by showing that the position is actually impossible to believe (without contradiction or complete absurdity). To see why, we need to take a fairly detailed look at just what would be involved in the claim that there is some sharp borderline on the Combined Spectrum, before which I am the survivor and after which I am no longer the survivor. By providing a few possibilities, we will see that the SBT is in a world of trouble.
I begin, however, with a few caveats. First, in what follows I presuppose a widely-held, specific materialist tenet: physical changes (to the brain) will result in mental changes. A Cartesian would beg to differ, of course, but we have seen practical reasons to ignore this view.
Second, I assume the SBT to hold that the person at the far end of the spectrum, a person constituted by fully 100% of the cloned body and brain cells of Garbo, is just GarboR. I take this to be a matter of common sense as well (it is also maintained by the reductionist). With these assumptions in hand, then, let us consider the following possible sharp borderlines in order: (1) I cease to exist at the 50% mark; (2) I cease to exist at some point above the 50% mark; and (3) I cease to exist at some point below the 50% mark.
First, let us suppose the SBT maintains that if the scientist were to flip 50 switches (and leave the remaining 50 switches unflipped), I would cease to exist and also that GarboR would begin to exist at that point as well. In other words (to make the scenario as clear as possible), on this supposition I would be the survivor if only 49% of my original cells/characteristics were destroyed and replaced, but I would not be the survivor -and GarboR would be the survivor -in the case in which the scientist flipped 50 switches.
could not be in existence either. In other words, if X does not exist when 50% of X's original body and brain cells do not exist, then neither I nor GarboR could exist at this point.
This response is too quick, however. After all, the SBT might say, what matters may simply be who you are to start with. You remain that person until the crucial transition-point, and then you become a different person. The borderline of 50%, then, would be the borderline for ceasing to be the same person, and GarboR isn't necessarily governed by that borderline. In other words, the only principle supposed to this point (call it "Principle C-50") is that X ceases to exist when 50% of X's body and brain cells cease to exist, but this principle is irrelevant for GarboR; consequently, it is not yet obvious why she could not begin to exist at the 50% mark.
Unfortunately for the SBT, this will not do. To see why, consider the following two- Principle C-50 also seems to imply that Shoebo would be the survivor. But if the principle implies both that I am the survivor and that I am not the survivor (i.e., Shoebo's the survivor), it must be false.
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Nevertheless, this contradiction may be avoided by pointing to an ambiguity in Principle C-50. On the one hand, it might be taken to mean that X ceases to exist just when X loses 50% (or more) of X's original body/brain cells period, no matter the process or length of time it occurs. On the other hand, it might be taken to mean that X ceases to exist just when X loses 50% (or more) of X's original body/brain cells all at once. On the former interpretation, then, the survivor of the two-stage 25% process would be Shoebo. On the latter interpretation, the survivor of each stage would be me.
A sufficient reason for thinking the principle must involve the former interpretation is that the latter interpretation would allow for the (by assumption) false conclusion that I could what distinguishes the two survivors is their history. In the first version the survivor is me because it was me originally in the chair and the alteration was identity-preserving. In the second version the survivor is GarboR because it was her originally in the chair and the alteration was identity-preserving. Nevertheless, this rejoinder yields yet another contradiction.
To see why, consider one last bizarre twist on an already bizarre case. Suppose first that I am seated in the special chair and the entire left side of my body is zapped out of existence, while the remaining right side is carefully preserved in the scientist's cryo-chamber. Then the restored Garbo Replica is seated in the same chair and the entire right side of her body is destroyed, with the remaining left side preserved in the cryo-chamber. According to Principle C-51, both GarboR and I will be the survivors once our missing parts are replaced. But now comes the fun part: the scientist then removes both halves from the cryo-chamber and fuses them together. Seated now in the chair is a person with 50% of my body and brain cells and 50% of GarboR's body and brain cells. And both of the fused halves started this long strange trip in the same chair.
Now the SBT adhering to C-51 is forced into a contradiction, for he must maintain that the fused survivor here is simultaneously both me and GarboR, i.e., the survivor is both me and not me, it is both GarboR and not GarboR. Who began the switch-flipping process in the chair is now seen as what it is: an irrelevant consideration, one that helps the SBT not one whit here.
Consequently, this position yields yet another contradiction.
A last-gasp reply for the SBT theorist might run as follows: "The fusion here described is a fusion of you and GarboR, which (ex hypothesi) is supposed to be thoroughly symmetrical with respect to your status versus hers and candidates for identity with the resulting person. Given this symmetry, the resulting person is not identical to either of you, since you're not identical to each other, and you both were equally good candidates for being identical with the resulting person. Consequently, the fusion brings into existence a new person, and there is no contradiction yielded."
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Unfortunately, this response is utterly ad hoc, and it quite simply denies Principle C-51, which directly implies that one's identity is preserved when only 50% of one's original body/brain cells are destroyed and replaced. If the sharp borderline is at 51% (or higher), then, quite simply, I survive at the 50% mark. And insofar as the same must hold for GarboR, the fused person in this scenario must be both me and not me, both GarboR and not GarboR, which is a contradiction. It is also important to note that this same argument applies if the SBT picks any point on the Spectrum between the 50% and 100% marks, for at each such instance we could show that by running this same fusion scenario we get a contradictory answer regarding the identity of the survivor at the 50% mark. If the SBT holds the person at the 1% mark to be Shoebo1 (i.e., not me), then by the blitz of arguments given previously, the SBT would be forced to admit that the person at the .01% mark is not me either (it would be Shoebo.01, say). And between the 0% and .01% marks on the Mini-Spectrum, there is yet another range of alterations possible. And so on.
In other words, the SBT is ultimately forced by this reasoning to admit that I cease to exist just when any change whatsoever occurs to my body or brain cells. If just one subatomic particle, anywhere on my person, is lost or altered, I die. In short, I (the person who wrote the word "I") am now dead. But such a conclusion is utterly absurd.
Thus there simply is no sharp borderline on the Combined Spectrum to which one could point without contradiction or absurdity. Consequently, the second proposed reaction to this case -the claim that there is some sharp borderline somewhere on the Spectrum, before which the survivor is me and after which the survivor is not me -fails, and we are left with the final, There are actually two other methodologies available here. The first is to take our commitments in these practical arenas as given, as brute data without need of justification (or as already justified), and then figure out a theory of identity than can account for them all, i.e., a theory answering the question "How are such commitments possible?" Another alternative is to start with certain of our fairly settled, considered convictions about some aspects of our lives, and then proceed to reorganize the various implicit principles involved in these convictions into a coherent theory of identity. From there, we would explore how the theory might apply to other, less clear, aspects of our lives. In engaging in this process, though we treat neither our initial convictions nor our theory as beyond revision. They would merely be "provisional fixed points,"
and they would each be subject to adjustment given the twin demands of consistency and intuitive appeal. This latter is of course the method of "reflective equilibrium," and it is a method I actually favor in the arena of personal identity. Nevertheless, because the methodology sketched in the text is the one most often employed in this arena, and because it yields a
conclusion compatible with what I believe we would conclude anyway with the reflective equilibrium approach (although I certainly will not argue for this point herein), I will jump on the bandwagon and employ it myself in this paper. 
